When the Call Comes from Inside The House: Lessons from Denmark

When thinking about security, we often think about how we keep threats out: cyber defences, building access controls, travelling with clean devices.

Yet, recent years have emphasised uncomfortable truths: insider threats can be embedded deep within research communities. Two case studies underscore how this can happen (whether intentionally or unintentionally).

Case Study 1: The Finnish Professor (University of Copenhagen)

In 2012, Danish authorities convicted a Finnish-born academic at the University of Copenhagen of assisting Russian intelligence. Over several years, the professor provided Russian diplomats—believed to be intelligence operatives—with information about university students and colleagues, ostensibly for “consulting.” Despite disclaimers that he did not intentionally work with spies, a Danish court determined that his disclosures could have advanced foreign intelligence operations and he received a five-month sentence for his role.

This incident exposed how legitimate academic collaborations could be used as cover for intelligence gathering and how insider access could allow profiling of students and faculty without detection.

Case Study 2: The “Russian House” Scandal (Technical University of Denmark, DTU)

Another notable breach occurred when a PhD graduate at DTU was convicted of espionage in 2020 after passing sensitive information about Danish energy technologies to Russian intelligence, acting as a conduit for technological know-how. He was sentenced to five years. This case brought new urgency to the insider threat discussion, pressing universities and security services to recognise the dangers of in-person infiltration and the use of foreign students or visiting researchers as intelligence assets.

The scandal led to:

• Danish authorities introducing extra security checks for researchers from high-risk countries.

• Heightened awareness in academic circles that not all collaboration is benign - sometimes, the threat is deliberately cultivated from within.

• Collaborative action to develop shared guidelines for international research and innovation cooperation

Institutional Response: Rebalancing Openness and Diligence

Recent years have seen a wave of reforms across Danish universities:

• Enhanced security measures - including systematic screening, locked labs, secured devices, and policies restricting unsupervised access to critical technology.

• Dedicated staff to lead on research security within the nation's universities.

• Cooperation between universities and government to drive improved awareness and better practice.

Lessons for the Global Research Community

Denmark’s experience offers several key insights:

• Insider threats are real, complex, and sometimes incredibly damaging.

• Due diligence processes must be both detailed and nimble.

• Universities need to invest in ongoing education: not only how to block threats, but how to recognise and respond when they come cloaked in legitimate wrappings.

• Institutions must balance security with openness; robust procedures can prevent harm, but a climate of excessive suspicion may chill vital international collaboration and deter scientific progress.

“Denmark is a global leader within a number of areas relating to technology, innovation and research. This world leadership... contributes to solving global challenges..., but it also makes Danish research institutions and companies attractive espionage targets." - PET

Conclusion

In a world of growing geopolitical rivalry, sometimes the call is coming from inside the house - and the practices that research organisations develop to defend against misuse and misappropriation must recognise the range of techniques used to access critical technologies.